[Opensim-dev] The essence of "grid"
Christian Scholz
cs at comlounge.net
Thu Apr 16 10:59:49 UTC 2009
Hi!
DZO wrote:
> I like to think of opensim as the VW version of Apache.
>
> I think something that is confusing us is that moving from region to region
> in opensim is pratically seemless, and the joins between the regions almost
> invisible. IE when walking from one region to another, you can see the new
> region appearing on the horizon, as if its just a continuation of the region
> you are in.
>
> In apache you can also move between sites / pages, but the change is much
> more visible, you have to actually click on a link and move away from your
> current page, its obvious that you have gone from one area to another, more
> so when moving between sites.
I would maybe see a grid more like pages on a site which might also be
bound together in one authentication realm.
Different grids might then be different sites. Not sure though how
useful that comparison is because apparently things are quite a bit
different.
> Both opensim regions and apache(internet) sites allow you to move between
> content hosted by different people and/or on different servers. I believe
> THIS is the area where the confusion comes in. In the conventional internet
> we don't mind typing a zillion passwords because we can obviously see that
> the pages are different. But in opensim it would seem strange to type in a
> password just to be able to take an extra step on the road you are already
> on.
Well, even on the web it gets more and more annoying with more and more
service to type in your password or actually to use a different one on
each of those. Esp. if signup also involves filling out your profile
once again, finding your friends etc. So on the web we also have a
development towards a more distributed model where you can delegate
things to separate services (e.g. authentication via OpenID, profile
could be retrieved using OpenSocial and OAuth).
And as said, I don't see a reason why this should be different in
virtual worlds, for a start you need the same things: authentication,
profile information, friends and so on.
> Personal opinion:
> - I don't believe centralising user profiles and managing permissions from
> there is a good idea for an open source project.
I think with more and more services which work based on such information
as user profiles and contacts it makes sense in general to not have a
centralized storage, be it open or closed source.
> - I do believe, as I have mentioned earlier, that opensim should have a very
> simple region based password system and the client should be allowed to
> manage multiple passwords such as a messenger or email application. This
> would divide the task of security up between components in an equal and
> logical way.
I would rather would like some system which does not need passwords such
as OAuth. Of course in the end it might come down to a similar thing.
> So opensim would allow grids and regions to ask for passwords from different
> user server components, and the client software would allow the creation of
> a user profile with multiple saved passwords.
Again I personally would protect those resources with OAuth. Those
tokens are also revokable and might be limited in lifetime or scope. You
give then each region (or group of regions) such a token which allows
that region to access your inventory and contact list but maybe not more
while a different region might also be able to access your group
memberships.
(The question then is though if a region really needs access to your
friends list in some distant future where not everything is proxied by a
sim but maybe accessed by the client directly).
> This would not break anything as it stands as it would be possible to set a
> region security to "grid" so anyone allowed to used the grid would also be
> able to use the regions, however, a region owner would be able to restrict
> useage in their own region and take ownership of their own user base, while
> managing their own hardware and content useage. This would facilitate social
> groups, business interests, and various other applications for the VW.
>
> In my view:
> Grid: Hosting company
> Region: Web page (perhaps only using the hosting company to link to a
> private server)
-- Christian
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: opensim-dev-bounces at lists.berlios.de
> [mailto:opensim-dev-bounces at lists.berlios.de] On Behalf Of
> opensim-dev-request at lists.berlios.de
> Sent: 16 April 2009 01:01
> To: opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
> Subject: Opensim-dev Digest, Vol 20, Issue 51
>
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> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: The essence of "grid" (Thomas Grimshaw)
> 2. Re: The essence of "grid" (Diva Canto)
> 3. Re: The essence of "grid" (Charles Krinke)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2009 22:41:57 +0100
> From: Thomas Grimshaw <tom at streamsense.net>
> Subject: Re: [Opensim-dev] The essence of "grid"
> To: opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
> Message-ID: <49E654A5.5080300 at streamsense.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Charles Krinke wrote:
>> At this point, the only way to stop a region from attaching to an
>> OpenSim grid is to put a fake entry into the regions table.
> Or.. change the password?
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2009 14:50:28 -0700
> From: Diva Canto <diva at metaverseink.com>
> Subject: Re: [Opensim-dev] The essence of "grid"
> To: opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
> Message-ID: <49E656A4.1030505 at metaverseink.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> I think we already have an understanding of what is needed for securing
> users from malicious hosts: client-side control, that's all. Client has
> direct control over user agents, user's inventory, IM, social network, etc.
> The regions stay out of it, they are only simulators of objects and agents.
> Grider is exploring that design space, and instrumenting OpenSim for it.
> We're very close to having OpenSim support these kinds of clients.
>
> However, in some cases, the user may want to give control, at least some, to
> the ... and this is where terminology gets tricky...
> simulators? "grid"? And why would that be, you may ask. Well, because that
> server-side (not to get into the choice of words again) may provide some
> cool stuff if you pass it the control. It may, for example, give you an
> additional world-specific inventory, or it may open agents for you in
> interesting 3d spaces, or you won't be able to play whatever game is going
> on in there unless the server-side has control over some of your data.
>
> But even this is *sortof* relatively simple to do, IF we align the concept
> of VW with the concept of trust domain. OSGrid, however, doesn't do that. So
> what would it mean for a user to visit OSGrid? With which server would the
> user's client share authority, if it were to share it?
>
>
> Christian Scholz wrote:
>> Hi!
>>
>> Cristina Videira Lopes schrieb:
>>> I'm trying to understand what it is that we are supposed to secure,
>>> because security depends entirely on that :-)
>> That usually is my problem with most of these discussions be it on
>> MMOX, AWG or social networking. So it would be good to have some sort
>> of list of what needs to be secured against what sort of action.
>>
>>> I've seen way too many talks/chats/posts/blogs talking about a Web of
>>> VWs in some form, while making the unwritten assumption that the
>>> concept of "grid" (aka Virtual World unit, or whatever you want to
>>> call it) aligns with the concept of a domain of trust (i.e. a bunch
>>> of simulators that trust each other, under the control of one
>>> authority). Then, a Web of VWs is the interconnection of those domains of
> trust.
>>> Well, OSGrid doesn't align with that. So either OSGrid is not a
>>> valid/sustainable use case for OpenSim or there's something wrong
>>> with that unwritten assumption. In my infinite tolerance towards
>>> variety, and given the empirical evidence here, I'm leaning towards the
> latter (i.e.
>>> there's something wrong with that assumption).
>> Unfortunately I am not too familiar on how OSGrid works but I can
>> explain how it could work with the scenario I described where we have
>> quite many separate services.
>>
>> In this case a user would login to a region with separate locations of
>> the user's inventory, a list of links to group memberships, a link to
>> the user's profile and so on.
>>
>> The region would then ask an authorization manager to get access to
>> these resources on behalf of the user. The user will then be asked
>> with a list of services the region wants access to and on "ok" this
>> access will be granted in form of OAuth access token which can be used
>> to perform signed requests to these services. (the concept of the auth
>> manager needs to be developed as mentioned).
>>
>> So in this case the region can only access a user's data after getting
>> those tokens. If this "ok" is given automatically though security will
>> obviously be lacking.
>>
>> Now many regions could be grouped into one region domain which might
>> mean that they e.g. provide some mapping services and they could maybe
>> use shared access to that data.
>>
>> In the case of a region domain consisting of regions operated by
>> different providers this of course means that a rogue sim indeed could
>> get access to that data. But in general I don't see a solution here
>> unless you really give each sim access upon visiting. Which of course
>> would be annoying.
>>
>>> Yes, OSGrid, as is, will always be extremely vulnerable towards
>>> insider rogues; technically, it's impossible to secure OSGrid's UGAIM
>>> servers from malicious sims connected to it. But so what? Maybe
>>> people want it like that, maybe the OSGrid community wants to perform
>>> human surveillance instead of applying technical solutions such as
>>> the Hypergrid (once it's matured). Should we stop supporting that use
> case?
>> I think in the case of a grid which is operated by many people and you
>> don't want just a shared map but also shared access for convenience
>> there is not much left for kicking out rogue domains. In fact a user
>> might not know that it's a bad sim when entering it anyway so even in
>> the case of a confirmation on each crossing that sim would probably
>> gain access.
>>
>> (Moreover I think bad clients is the more likely case of e.g. content
>> theft).
>>
>>> If we continue to support the existence of grids like OSGrid, then we
>>> need to think what it means for the users to visit such grids, and
>>> how they can visit them securely -- that's all I'm trying to figure out.
>> They should at least be made aware that there is not one entity
>> running it you can sue (well, I don't know the TOS so I don't know if
>> you actually could sue somebody).
>>
>> -- Christian
>>
>> PS: I know that the OAuth stuff is far away from what would be
>> possible right now as it would also mean quite some changes to the
>> client, I am mostly mentioning it for discussion purposes and because
>> those are standards which are on the rise right now.
>>
>>> Justin Clark-Casey wrote:
>>>> Charles Krinke wrote:
>>>>> OSGrid exists with two goals.
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Test OpenSim SVN on a regular basis and report results to aid in
>>>>> software development.
>>>>> 2. Nurture a community.
>>>>>
>>>>> We need to start by considering that OpenSim splits the asset
>>>>> storage between regions and the OpenSim assetServer. So, the
>>>>> OpenSim asset model is a little different then SecondLife since we
>>>>> already distribute some assets between regions and the UGAIM.
>>>> I didn't know you were doing this already. Is there anywhere you could
> point to with more details?
>>>>> Are we saying that OSGrid is doing something problematic and
>>>>> pertubating the OpenSim development? I am confused about the OSGrid
>>>>> comments in this philosophical discussion. As I see the whole
>>>>> situation, OSGrid is testing the mainline trunk SVN from OpenSim in
>>>>> a manner consistent with the desires of the community.
>>>> Not at all. I think the debate is more about how the architecture
>>>> will move forward in the future. As you know, regions on OSGrid
>>>> have to be pretty trustworthy so as not to abuse the central grid
>>>> services. This classic architecture won't go away, but it might be that
> active development and research switches to other architectures (e.g. client
> side asset/inventory access, hypergrid), which can be better secured for a
> robust distributed virtual environment.
>>>> OSGrid may want to consider at some point whether it wants to
>>>> migrate or switch to other architectures once these have matured
> further. I doubt that this maturity is all that imminent.
>>>> Anyway, I'm probably putting words into Diva's mouth now.
>>>>
>>>>> Charles
>>>>>
>>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> -----
>>>>> *From:* Justin Clark-Casey <jjustincc at googlemail.com>
>>>>> *To:* opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
>>>>> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 15, 2009 8:24:45 AM
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Opensim-dev] The essence of "grid"
>>>>>
>>>>> Diva Canto wrote:
>>>>> > As I zoom in on issues of trust and security, I'm getting to the
>>>>> point > where I need a sharp definition of "grid". What is a grid,
>>>>> besides being > a map/lookup service and a user accounts service?
>>>>> >
>>>>> > a) nothing more than that
>>>>> > b) a trust domain
>>>>> >
>>>>> > If we choose b) then we need to think about OSGrid-like grids.
>>>>> How can > we trust that a collection of regions administered by
>>>>> different people > will behave? Can OSGrid-like grids survive
>>>>> without ToS being signed > between the grid operator and the
>>>>> region operators? What if the ToS is > such that it delegates to
>>>>> the region admins any liability on bad things > happening in their
>>>>> regions? -- that leaves the user with no central > authority to
> complain, which is as good as not having a trust domain.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > If OSGrid-like grids (i.e. no contracts, or very loose ones;
>>>>> just a map > service) are to exist, then it's clear that b) doesn't
> hold in general.
>>>>> > It means that there can be grids that are simply a collection of
>>>>> regions > that come together in virtual space, but whose
>>>>> trustworthiness as a > whole doesn't exist.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > The Hypergrid is specifically designed to cross trust
>>>>> boundaries. Should > the OSGrid-like grids become HG-ed sims that
>>>>> share the same map, and let > "grids" be, fully, trust domains?
>>>>> >
>>>>> > You may think I'm getting into philosophy, but this is critical
>>>>> for the > technical work I'm doing right now related to
>>>>> authentication, > server-side vs client-side authority, etc. If we
>>>>> can assume that a > "grid" is a uniform trust domain with a
>>>>> central authority, things will > be simpler in many ways. If not,
> things will be a bit more complicated.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Thoughts?
>>>>>
>>>>> I think that you could adopt b) without having a philosophical
>>>>> problem with OSGrid. I would say that even the 'loose contracts'
>>>>> on OSGrid are a form of trust. If someone were to abuse that trust
>>>>> then I be very surprised if they were not removed from the grid.
>>>>>
>>>>> If OSGrid wanted better security by not sharing the current central
>>>>> services then perhaps they could stipulate that new regions had to
>>>>> connect by Hypergrid rather than the current model (once the
>>>>> various gaps in Hypergrid are ironed out)?
>>>>> Then, in a sense, all the directly connected regions becomes a
>>>>> large Hypergrid node in the federation that makes up OSGrid.
>>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>> > Opensim-dev mailing list
>>>>> > Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
>>>>> <mailto:Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de>
>>>>> > https://lists.berlios.de/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> justincc
>>>>> Justin Clark-Casey
>>>>> http://justincc.wordpress.com
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Opensim-dev mailing list
>>>>> Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de <mailto:Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de>
>>>>> https://lists.berlios.de/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> -----
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Opensim-dev mailing list
>>>>> Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
>>>>> https://lists.berlios.de/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Opensim-dev mailing list
>>> Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
>>> https://lists.berlios.de/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev
>>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2009 15:01:07 -0700 (PDT)
> From: Charles Krinke <cfk at pacbell.net>
> Subject: Re: [Opensim-dev] The essence of "grid"
> To: diva at metaverseink.com, opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
> Message-ID: <678807.81030.qm at web82604.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> You have completely lost me.
>
> OSGrid uses the OpenSim UserServer for its "trust domain", as do all other
> OpenSim grids.
>
> Perhaps you need to change your semantics or argument a bit as there is
> nothing different about OSGrid then any of the other OpenSim grids.
>
> If you could perhaps make your debate a bit more focused on OpenSim grids in
> general, then maybe we can figure out how to accomodate your thought
> processes.
>
> Charles
>
>
>
>
> ________________________________
> From: Diva Canto <diva at metaverseink.com>
> To: opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
> Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2009 2:50:28 PM
> Subject: Re: [Opensim-dev] The essence of "grid"
>
> I think we already have an understanding of what is needed for securing
> users from malicious hosts: client-side control, that's all. Client has
> direct control over user agents, user's inventory, IM, social network, etc.
> The regions stay out of it, they are only simulators of objects and agents.
> Grider is exploring that design space, and instrumenting OpenSim for it.
> We're very close to having OpenSim support these kinds of clients.
>
> However, in some cases, the user may want to give control, at least some, to
> the ... and this is where terminology gets tricky...
> simulators? "grid"? And why would that be, you may ask. Well, because that
> server-side (not to get into the choice of words again) may provide some
> cool stuff if you pass it the control. It may, for example, give you an
> additional world-specific inventory, or it may open agents for you in
> interesting 3d spaces, or you won't be able to play whatever game is going
> on in there unless the server-side has control over some of your data.
>
> But even this is *sortof* relatively simple to do, IF we align the concept
> of VW with the concept of trust domain. OSGrid, however, doesn't do that. So
> what would it mean for a user to visit OSGrid? With which server would the
> user's client share authority, if it were to share it?
>
>
> Christian Scholz wrote:
>> Hi!
>>
>> Cristina Videira Lopes schrieb:
>>> I'm trying to understand what it is that we are supposed to secure,
>>> because security depends entirely on that :-)
>> That usually is my problem with most of these discussions be it on
>> MMOX, AWG or social networking. So it would be good to have some sort
>> of list of what needs to be secured against what sort of action.
>>
>>> I've seen way too many talks/chats/posts/blogs talking about a Web of
>>> VWs in some form, while making the unwritten assumption that the
>>> concept of "grid" (aka Virtual World unit, or whatever you want to
>>> call it) aligns with the concept of a domain of trust (i.e. a bunch
>>> of simulators that trust each other, under the control of one
>>> authority). Then, a Web of VWs is the interconnection of those domains of
> trust.
>>> Well, OSGrid doesn't align with that. So either OSGrid is not a
>>> valid/sustainable use case for OpenSim or there's something wrong
>>> with that unwritten assumption. In my infinite tolerance towards
>>> variety, and given the empirical evidence here, I'm leaning towards the
> latter (i.e.
>>> there's something wrong with that assumption).
>> Unfortunately I am not too familiar on how OSGrid works but I can
>> explain how it could work with the scenario I described where we have
>> quite many separate services.
>>
>> In this case a user would login to a region with separate locations of
>> the user's inventory, a list of links to group memberships, a link to
>> the user's profile and so on.
>>
>> The region would then ask an authorization manager to get access to
>> these resources on behalf of the user. The user will then be asked
>> with a list of services the region wants access to and on "ok" this
>> access will be granted in form of OAuth access token which can be used
>> to perform signed requests to these services. (the concept of the auth
>> manager needs to be developed as mentioned).
>>
>> So in this case the region can only access a user's data after getting
>> those tokens. If this "ok" is given automatically though security will
>> obviously be lacking.
>>
>> Now many regions could be grouped into one region domain which might
>> mean that they e.g. provide some mapping services and they could maybe
>> use shared access to that data.
>>
>> In the case of a region domain consisting of regions operated by
>> different providers this of course means that a rogue sim indeed could
>> get access to that data. But in general I don't see a solution here
>> unless you really give each sim access upon visiting. Which of course
>> would be annoying.
>>
>>> Yes, OSGrid, as is, will always be extremely vulnerable towards
>>> insider rogues; technically, it's impossible to secure OSGrid's UGAIM
>>> servers from malicious sims connected to it. But so what? Maybe
>>> people want it like that, maybe the OSGrid community wants to perform
>>> human surveillance instead of applying technical solutions such as
>>> the Hypergrid (once it's matured). Should we stop supporting that use
> case?
>> I think in the case of a grid which is operated by many people and you
>> don't want just a shared map but also shared access for convenience
>> there is not much left for kicking out rogue domains. In fact a user
>> might not know that it's a bad sim when entering it anyway so even in
>> the case of a confirmation on each crossing that sim would probably
>> gain access.
>>
>> (Moreover I think bad clients is the more likely case of e.g. content
>> theft).
>>
>>> If we continue to support the existence of grids like OSGrid, then we
>>> need to think what it means for the users to visit such grids, and
>>> how they can visit them securely -- that's all I'm trying to figure out.
>> They should at least be made aware that there is not one entity
>> running it you can sue (well, I don't know the TOS so I don't know if
>> you actually could sue somebody).
>>
>> -- Christian
>>
>> PS: I know that the OAuth stuff is far away from what would be
>> possible right now as it would also mean quite some changes to the
>> client, I am mostly mentioning it for discussion purposes and because
>> those are standards which are on the rise right now.
>>
>>> Justin Clark-Casey wrote:
>>>> Charles Krinke wrote:
>>>>> OSGrid exists with two goals.
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Test OpenSim SVN on a regular basis and report results to aid in
>>>>> software development.
>>>>> 2. Nurture a community.
>>>>>
>>>>> We need to start by considering that OpenSim splits the asset
>>>>> storage between regions and the OpenSim assetServer. So, the
>>>>> OpenSim asset model is a little different then SecondLife since we
>>>>> already distribute some assets between regions and the UGAIM.
>>>> I didn't know you were doing this already. Is there anywhere you could
> point to with more details?
>>>>> Are we saying that OSGrid is doing something problematic and
>>>>> pertubating the OpenSim development? I am confused about the OSGrid
>>>>> comments in this philosophical discussion. As I see the whole
>>>>> situation, OSGrid is testing the mainline trunk SVN from OpenSim in
>>>>> a manner consistent with the desires of the community.
>>>> Not at all. I think the debate is more about how the architecture
>>>> will move forward in the future. As you know, regions on OSGrid
>>>> have to be pretty trustworthy so as not to abuse the central grid
>>>> services. This classic architecture won't go away, but it might be that
> active development and research switches to other architectures (e.g. client
> side asset/inventory access, hypergrid), which can be better secured for a
> robust distributed virtual environment.
>>>> OSGrid may want to consider at some point whether it wants to
>>>> migrate or switch to other architectures once these have matured
> further. I doubt that this maturity is all that imminent.
>>>> Anyway, I'm probably putting words into Diva's mouth now.
>>>>
>>>>> Charles
>>>>>
>>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> -----
>>>>> *From:* Justin Clark-Casey <jjustincc at googlemail.com>
>>>>> *To:* opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
>>>>> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 15, 2009 8:24:45 AM
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Opensim-dev] The essence of "grid"
>>>>>
>>>>> Diva Canto wrote:
>>>>> > As I zoom in on issues of trust and security, I'm getting to the
>>>>> point > where I need a sharp definition of "grid". What is a grid,
>>>>> besides being > a map/lookup service and a user accounts service?
>>>>> >
>>>>> > a) nothing more than that
>>>>> > b) a trust domain
>>>>> >
>>>>> > If we choose b) then we need to think about OSGrid-like grids.
>>>>> How can > we trust that a collection of regions administered by
>>>>> different people > will behave? Can OSGrid-like grids survive
>>>>> without ToS being signed > between the grid operator and the
>>>>> region operators? What if the ToS is > such that it delegates to
>>>>> the region admins any liability on bad things > happening in their
>>>>> regions? -- that leaves the user with no central > authority to
> complain, which is as good as not having a trust domain.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > If OSGrid-like grids (i.e. no contracts, or very loose ones;
>>>>> just a map > service) are to exist, then it's clear that b) doesn't
> hold in general.
>>>>> > It means that there can be grids that are simply a collection of
>>>>> regions > that come together in virtual space, but whose
>>>>> trustworthiness as a > whole doesn't exist.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > The Hypergrid is specifically designed to cross trust
>>>>> boundaries. Should > the OSGrid-like grids become HG-ed sims that
>>>>> share the same map, and let > "grids" be, fully, trust domains?
>>>>> >
>>>>> > You may think I'm getting into philosophy, but this is critical
>>>>> for the > technical work I'm doing right now related to
>>>>> authentication, > server-side vs client-side authority, etc. If we
>>>>> can assume that a > "grid" is a uniform trust domain with a
>>>>> central authority, things will > be simpler in many ways. If not,
> things will be a bit more complicated.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Thoughts?
>>>>>
>>>>> I think that you could adopt b) without having a philosophical
>>>>> problem with OSGrid. I would say that even the 'loose contracts'
>>>>> on OSGrid are a form of trust. If someone were to abuse that trust
>>>>> then I be very surprised if they were not removed from the grid.
>>>>>
>>>>> If OSGrid wanted better security by not sharing the current central
>>>>> services then perhaps they could stipulate that new regions had to
>>>>> connect by Hypergrid rather than the current model (once the
>>>>> various gaps in Hypergrid are ironed out)?
>>>>> Then, in a sense, all the directly connected regions becomes a
>>>>> large Hypergrid node in the federation that makes up OSGrid.
>>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>> > Opensim-dev mailing list
>>>>> > Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
>>>>> <mailto:Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de>
>>>>> > https://lists.berlios.de/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> justincc
>>>>> Justin Clark-Casey
>>>>> http://justincc.wordpress.com
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Opensim-dev mailing list
>>>>> Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de <mailto:Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de>
>>>>> https://lists.berlios.de/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> -----
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