[Opensim-dev] Security: multiple or the most generic?

Diva Canto diva at metaverseink.com
Mon Apr 13 17:43:40 UTC 2009


The corollary being that multiple implies some clever software 
architecting...

Diva Canto wrote:
> I've been debating with myself and with some ppl in IRC about whether 
> OpenSim should support many security schemes or shoot for the most 
> generic one. Advice appreciated. Here's the situation.
>
> There are already 3 different authentication schemes on the pipeline for 
> Teleports, one of them being the current one, and two being on my local 
> non-committed changes. These 3 schemes are: (a) no authentication; (b) 
> session authentication; and (c) key authentication (keys being unique, 
> one-time strings for each client-server pair).
>
> (a) is what is currently in place -- hence my nagging about the lack of 
> security in non-VPN'ed grids. But for VPN'ed grids this is perfectly fine.
> (b) is a weak form of authentication that prevents spoofing from the 
> outside of a grid, but that doesn't prevent spoofing from inside. That 
> is, regions can find out the sessionID of users when they're logged in, 
> and impersonate them. In open grids this is highly unsafe; but in 
> walled-garden grids, this is perfectly fine.
> (c) is the strongest form, as it allows clients to have a lot more 
> control -- not the raw Linden client, which doesn't quite do that, but 
> others. (c) can also be implemented in the current setup, with the raw 
> Linden client, and with server-side teleports. It's kind of meaningless 
> in this case, but it's no worse than (b) for open grids.
>
> So, back to the original question. Should OpenSim support all of these 
> and more, or should we shoot for (c) only?
>
> _______________________________________________
> Opensim-dev mailing list
> Opensim-dev at lists.berlios.de
> https://lists.berlios.de/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev
>
>   




More information about the Opensim-dev mailing list